25X1

23 March 1962

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Copy No. C &

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



25X1

DIA AND DOS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET

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- tinues but border may remain open to US aid shipments. (Page vi)
- Iraq-Kuwait: Iraq continues diplomatic retaliation against countries accepting Kuwaiti representatives. (Page vi)

25X1 (Continued)

23 March 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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13. F	Bolivia: President Paz complains of unfair treatment un- ler the Alliance for Progress. (Page vit)	 2

25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975 2006300040001-7 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 23 March 1962 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 *France-Algeria: The OAS on 22 March intensified ter-rorism and strikes in Algiers and Oran, and created so much tension in Corsica that the government airlifted additional security forces to the island. 25 0 25**X** i 25X1

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25X1	ers of its ability OAS may feel c	rder to convince its European to sabotage De Gaulle's Alge ompelled to take more forcef le government's moves toward ords.	erian policy, the	25X1
25X1	for vice premier to Morocco. An PAG deliberately	the PAG were reportedly imprompt US action in furnishing Ben Bella's 21 March trip for the Bender Walmsley in Tunis y scheduled his 20 March appended ahead of that of the Sovie	g an aircraft rom Switzerland feels that the cointment with	25X1
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	23 Mar 62	DAILY BRIEF	ii 1 25X1	

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	represents about I hour strike for 23 Embassy that the the intervention in	the Peronista-led bloc of labor half of organized laborhas a March; Peronista leaders inf strikes will continue until Fro the provinces where they have mits Peronistas "to participa"	nnounced a 24- ormed the US ondizi cancels re won electoral
25X1	ance of Frondizi in reshuffle. The nadizi, and leading a "with great relucts ident on condition who are of national or Communism."	al arena, the air force still favor the presidency, following a avy, which wanted a prompt out army officers have now appare ance" to permit Frondizi to rethat he appoint ministers to that stature and free from any tall stature will be considerable pot few days until the compositioned.	suitable cabinet ster of Fron- ently agreed emain as pres- ne new cabinet int of Peronism litical jockey-
	Ambassador McBr	Madrid, the Spanish foreign ride that Spain preferred a France of Peron; he stressed the wa	ondizi-type re-
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	Approved For Rusase 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975/2006300040001-7	25X1
25X1	between Spain and the Frondizi government. The foreign minister also pointed out that Peron is in Spain at Frondizi's request and that Peron had given the Spanish no trouble and had not violated the conditions of his asylum. The foreign minister did not believe Peron would undertake "overt political activity" from Spain at this time.	25X1
25X1	Israel-Syria: On 21 March Foreign Minister Meir said Israel's cabinet had decided, in order to permit a relaxation of tension, to keep patrol boats off Lake Tiberias during the next few days and not "at this time" to initiate further re- taliatory action. That same morning, however, an air battle occurred in which the Syrians claim to have downed an Israeli Super Mystere jet, and that night, according to the Israelis, Syrians fired on two villages north of Lake Tiberias?	
	/In Damascus the Syrians are displaying captured Israeli half-tracks, and speakers are pointing out that the equipment is of American manufacture. The half-tracks are rebuilt World War II vehicles which the Israelis purchased on the surplus market. /The Syrian Government also has accused Egypt of aiding Israel by refusing to return Syrian arms, aircraft, and ships held by Egypt at the time of Syria's secession from the UAR.	25X1 25X1
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•	23 Mar 62 DAILY BRIEF iv	

months, and may be willing to use the negotiations as a face- saving pretext to extend the present temporary border opera- tions beyond the 29 March deadline. Iraq-Kuwait: The Qasim regime appears to be stiffen- ing its attitude toward those countries maintaining foreign diplomatic representation in Kuwait. On 17 March it withdrew its ambassador in Tokyo and threatened to close the Japanese Embassy in Baghdad. The Iraqi ambassadors in Iran and Jor- dan were withdrawn after these countries had received Kuwaiti		25X° Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T009754	
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recalled following the Kuwaiti ambassador's presentation of his credentials.		recalled following the Kuwaiti ambassador's presentation of his	
/Kuwait is exerting considerable pressure on Lebanon for		/Kuwait is exerting considerable pressure on Lebanon for	
an exchange of ambassadors and is said to have threatened		an exchange of ambassadors and is said to have threatened	
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•	Approved For Release	e 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975 <i>A</i>	6 06300040001-7	25X1
25X1	Lebanese refuse. dan, Britain, Sau their credentials Sudan, and Leban has not yet recogn League activities	t Lebanese economic interes So far ambassadors from t di Arabia, Iran, and the US in Kuwait. Among the Arab on have not yet sent emissa nized Kuwait. Iraq continue as a result of Kuwait's parti	he UAR, Jor- have presented states, Libya, aries, and Syria s to boycott Arab	25X1 25X1
	League.			
[i	on 19 March that under the Alliand and Chile have re livia which has	sident Paz told the US amba he felt Bolivia was not bein e for Progress. He charge eceived relatively larger all made more progress in sucl	g treated fairly d that Argentina ocations than Bo- n basic institu-	
25X1	tional changes as	s tax and land reform empha S ambassador points out tha	sized by President	
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Brazilian Interest in Shale Oil Development

Soviet technicians spent three months in Brazil in early 1960 under the auspices of a private Brazilian firm, CIRB, which has concessionary rights on some shale deposits. On the basis of Soviet surveys, a small pilot plant was built in the USSR and Brazilian shale was shipped there for experimental purposes. The prototype plant to be set up in Brazil would be used to determine the feasibility of producing gas commercially.

Both the USSR and Communist China have had considerable experience in processing oil shale. China's vast deposits of shale in Manchuria were developed originally by the Japanese;

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the processing facilities were later expanded in the postwar period with Soviet assistance. China was producing shale oil at a rate of about 20,000 barrels a day in 1961, and plans call for continuous expansion of the industry. Soviet capabilities for providing assistance in the development of Brazil's oil shale are based on more than 40 years of experience in the field. The USSR probably is capable of providing any type of equipment found in the West and some not used outside the bloc.

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Soviet Ambassador to Visit Bolivia

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In 1960 the USSR tentatively offered a credit of \$150,000,-000 and a tin smelter, which has great appeal in Bolivia, and negotiations on these offers have apparently been delayed primarily by President Paz. Paz is under increased pressure to give serious consideration to Soviet aid because of campaigning in Bolivia for congressional elections in June. The nominating convention of the government party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), is scheduled to open on 24 March and, while MNR nominations are probably still tantamount to election for most seats as has been true since 1956, the party contains two leftist factions which are not under Paz' control. Half the Chamber of Deputies and 15 of 27 senators are to be elected.

En route to Bolivia Ambassador Bazykin was not permitted to deplane in Peru and was obliged to proceed to Santiago, where he was given 48 hours to leave Chile, according to a press report. His expected visit to Ecuador was "postponed" at the last moment. Ecuador's President Arosemena recently declared that he was willing to see an expansion of the currently insignificant trade between his country and the USSR. Bazykin planned an extensive trip to Latin American countries a year ago, but only Venezuela and Ecuador granted him visas at that time, and his tour failed to produce any significant results.

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THE PRESIDENT
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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

